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Abstract 
Theories of hominin and human cognitive evolution have traditionally focused on the 
phylogeny of the human brain, and on comparisons of human and primate brains in 
relation to social or ecological variables. Far less attention has been paid to ontogenetic 
processes, despite the recognition that experience has a profound influence on adult 
cognition. In this paper we discuss the interplay between phylogeny and ontogeny by 
examining relationships between human brain size, developmental scheduling and 
cognition.  
 The correlates of large brains include not only altered subsistence and life-history 
strategies to meet associated energetic costs, but also on macro- and micro-scale 
structural adaptations required to meet increased processing costs which mean that 
larger brains are of necessity more highly interconnected brains, with higher degrees of 
folding o the neocortex (gyrification) and higher ratios of myelinated connections 
between neurons (white matter) to neurons themselves (grey matter). Here we argue 
that the combination of these evolutionary trends underpins the complexity of human 
behaviour, as the neural circuits involved in cognitive mechanisms such as the mirror 
neuron system (the system governing motor emulation and imitation) and theory of 
mind (fundamental in social cognition) mature only slowly, and require considerable 
socially-scaffolded experience to develop to their full potential. These abilities are likely 
to be fundamental in characteristically human behaviours such as the cultural 
transmission of complex forms of tool manufacture and use attested to in the 
archaeological record, and their elaborated modern human forms, we argue, are 
possible only in the context of the evolution of relatively slower trajectories of brain 
growth and hence longer periods during which the growing brain can be influenced by 
experience among modern humans relative to other primates.  
Here we review some of the differences in ontogenetic brain development 
between humans and other primates, and compare the rates and trajectories of neural 
development between ourselves and our closest living relatives the chimpanzees to 
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suggest that the human pattern of expanded periods of growth coupled with slower 
trajectories of neural development is likely to have been of huge significance during 
hominin evolution. In addition, we discuss fossil and archaeological proxies which 
might allow the reconstruction of evolutionary patterns of development, suggesting that 
it is only post-Homo erectus and specifically among Homo heidelbergensis and Homo 
neanderthalensis populations that developmental patterns approximate those of 
modern humans, arguing for a similar – but not identical – role for socially-scaffolded 
learning of complex technical skills as among modern groups in these species. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Theories of hominin and human cognitive evolution have traditionally focused on the 
phylogeny of the human brain in relation to socio-ecological variables. A prominent 
example of such research is the Social Brain Hypothesis, the central tenet of which 
suggests that the size of the neocortex places constraints on social cognition and hence 
the size of the social group (Dunbar 1992, 9). Far less attention has been paid to 
ontogenetic, developmental processes such as the effects of infant socialization within 
these larger and/or more complex social groups, despite the fact that many lines of 
evidence now suggest that length and intensity of development and socialization have a 
profound influence on adult cognition and particularly on social performance.  
By arguing for a renewed focus on ontogeny we are not suggesting that phylogeny 
is not important. Experiments in raising chimpanzee infants in human households did 
not produce simply unusually hairy humans (Hayes 1952) – our genetic heritage is of 
course fundamental to the structure and function of our brains, and to our development 
more generally. Indeed, our argument below will be based on the premise that it is the 
phylogenetic evolution of crucial life history parameters that makes the role of ontogeny, 
development and environmental so important. Adult cognition and indeed brain 
configuration is the result of the interplay between phylogeny and genetics on the one 
hand and ontogeny and an individual‟s interactions with the physical and the social 
environment on the other. Even fully „modern‟ Homo sapiens do not automatically 
become fully-functioning members of their societies, any more than other animals 
denied environmental input at critical periods of development acquire many of their 
own species-typical traits – even those often considered genetically „hardwired‟ such as 
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birdsong require experience and exposure to environmental stimuli to develop (e.g. 
Brainard and Doupe 2002). One of the aims of this paper is thus to argue that both 
phylogeny and ontogeny must be considered in any account of hominin evolution. 
 
We will argue here that it is in fact the strong relationships between brain size and life 
history (Robson and Wood 2008; Barrickman et al. 2007; Smith and Tompkins 1995; 
Harvey et al. 1986) that are key to investigating hominin brains. We will examine the 
general ontogenetic trajectory of brain growth in humans relative to that in 
chimpanzees, and the relevance of these trajectories for social cognition, focusing 
particularly on two specific aspects of brain structure – gyrification and the ratios of 
grey and white matter in the brain – that are of particular importance during brain 
development. In the final section of the paper we consider the implications of a 
difference in trajectories between humans and chimpanzees for an increasing 
(phylo)genetic role for ontogenetic developmental processes of socialization during 
hominin evolution. 
 
Ontogeny and phylogeny of human life history and growth 
 
Modern humans have a larger than expected adult brain for our body size, relative to the 
ratio in other primates (Isler et al. 2008). In theory, encephalization could be achieved 
by either extending the period or increasing the rate of brain growth (or through some 
combination of the two; Robson and Wood 2008, 401). Either of these paths to 
encephalization will necessarily have significant implications for wider life history 
strategies. 
Human life histories have much in common with those of the great apes. All great 
apes have relatively slow life histories, with long lifespans and slow growth (Charnov 
and Berrigan 1993). Slower life histories also correlate with larger adult body size (as 
energy can be invested in growth over a longer period), as well as with a constellation of 
other traits including larger babies (because larger mothers can invest in larger 
offspring), longer gestations and later age at first reproduction (Zollikofer and Ponce de 
Léon 2010; Robson and Wood 2008).  Most elements of the human life history „package‟ 
– with the interesting exceptions of age at first weaning and interbirth interval – see 
discussion in Robson & Wood (2008) are thus predictable from general primate trends, 
but are at the extreme end of the spectrum (Robson and Wood 2008). Our large body 
 4 
and brain size mean that we develop extremely slowly, with an extended period of 
juvenile dependence, late puberty and age at first reproduction, and years (even 
decades) of prolonged and intensive parental effort.  
Pre-reproductive phases of human life are therefore absolutely and relatively 
longer than observed among other large-bodied apes with similar gestation lengths 
(Crews and Gerber 2003) and may even include evolutionarily novel stages of 
development such as adolescence (e.g. del Giudice et al. 2009; Locke and Bogin 2006; 
Bogin 1999; Schultz 1969). This unique human combination of life history traits has 
most frequently been explained in terms of selection for extended periods of 
development as an adaptation for the acquisition of complex ecological and/or 
technological foraging skills (e.g. del Giudice et al. 2009; MacDonald 2007), social skills 
(Joffe 1997), or indeed both (Walker et al. 2006).  
A related possibility is that the human life history strategy may have been 
adaptive because it mitigates ecological risk or reduces mortality. Under this hypothesis 
juvenile growth rates are slow because energetic resources are directed towards brains 
and immune systems to reduce the risk of starvation, and because slower rates of 
growth free up resources that can be used to feed younger siblings (Crews and Gerber 
2003). The resulting reduction in adult mortality among humans compared to other 
great apes (Robson and Wood 2008) may have reduced constraints on prolongation of 
growth, development and longer life spans in general, perhaps aided by cultural factors 
such as „material culture, language, and socio-culturally elaborated life ways, including 
long-term care of family members and late-life reproduction by men‟ (Crews and Gerber 
2003). 
Although in this argument 
 
„… juvenility did not evolve primarily for skill-learning, … it would nonetheless 
permit extensive learning ... once extended skills/social learning became possible 
thanks to a long juvenility, a self-reinforcing cycle could have ensued, in which 
the advantages of learning generated an evolutionary pressure to increase 
juvenility even further and promote the growth of even bigger brains‟ (del 
Giudice et al. 2009, 9)  
 
As well as their derived life history strategies modern humans are characterized 
by a distinctive pattern of growth. While human gestations are not significantly longer 
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than those of other anthropoids (Crews and Gerber 2003), they do demonstrate several 
differences in the allocation of energy to their foetuses, particularly in the last trimester 
when human foetal neurological development is fast-tracked at the expense of other 
tissues (Crews and Gerber 2003), contributing greatly to humans‟ secondary altriciality. 
This prioritization of brain growth continues throughout the first few years of life in 
humans: while brain growth continues at its rapid early pace for some time after 
infancy, bodily growth rates decline until the pubertal growth spurt corrects the 
imbalance (Bogin 1999).  
Regardless of this rapid peri- and post-natal brain growth, at birth human infants 
have achieved a smaller proportion of their brain growth than other great apes,  and this 
difference is maintained throughout their growth., as demonstrated clearly in Figure 1. 
Humans therefore reach their adult brain size more slowly than other primates. 
However, the differences have been exaggerated; the allometric exponent of neonatal 
brain size relative to adult brain size is negative (i.e., larger-brained species typically 
have smaller relative neonatal brain sizes), and human neonates have more or less the 
size of brain expected for an anthropoid primate of our brain size (DeSilva and Lesnik 
2008), at ~29.9% of adult size compared to ~40.1% for chimpanzees (see DeSilva and 
Lesnik 2006 for a comprehensive review). Human infants also reach adult brain size 
earlier than usually claimed – on average 90% of adult brain size is achieved by around 
5 years, only 1 year later than in chimpanzees (Robson and Wood 2008). While human 
mothers give birth to unusually large infants, then, those infants‟ brains are only slightly 
smaller than we would expect based on primate trends. 
In addition, the overall trajectories of relative brain growth for both humans and 
chimpanzees are remarkably similar (Figure 1), suggesting that if humans were simply 
born later we would not deviate markedly from general great apes‟ gestational strategies 
– at least, in terms of brain development. As discussed above, when dental and somatic 
or bodily growth are also taken into account, human ontogenetic patterns deviate much 
more markedly from those of chimpanzees, being significantly slower; Zollikofer and 
Ponce de Léon 2010, 443. Nevertheless, in terms of the degree of neural development of 
our offspring relative to those of other primates, humans do appear to have an 
anomalously short gestation period. One potential selective pressure for this probably 
relates to the constraints imposed by the size of the female pelvic canal, itself reduced 
relative to that of other primates by the bipedal posture of humans (Franciscus 2009).  
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However, pelvic capacity is unlikely to be the only cause of these difference 
between humans‟ and other primates‟ brain development. Postnatal development is not 
linear, and while comparisons of neonatal and adult brain size are informative, 
consideration of patterns of growth at a finer scale reveal more differences between 
humans and other great apes that may have significant implications for adult cognition 
and behaviour. 
While among precocial primates high gestational brain growth rates slow rapidly 
after birth relative to overall bodily growth, among (secondarily) altricial primates these 
rapid gestational rates of brain growth continue (Martin 1990). In humans these rapid 
growth trajectories continue for a full year after birth, compensating somewhat for our 
highly altricial offspring‟s small neonatal brain size. By a year after birth, human infants 
are pursuing a brain to body growth trajectory much like that of other primates – clearly 
demonstrated in Figure 2, in which we have „shifted‟ a chimpanzee trajectory to be as 
altricial (i.e. small-brained) at birth as a human neonate. 
Thus while trajectories of growth relative to adult brain size are not radically 
different among humans compared to other primates, growth rates do display some 
interesting differences. Figure 2 compares the growth rates of chimpanzees and humans 
over the first five years of life, and demonstrates that while rates of brain growth in 
chimpanzees peak no more than two months after birth, the human peak again occurs a 
full year later, at approximately 14 months. Note also that the peak growth rate in 
humans is somewhat lower than that in chimpanzees – meaning that despite our 
extreme altriciality, our brains never grow as fast postnatally (relative to their size) as do 
those of chimpanzees. Finally, it is also clear from this graph that the relative amount of 
brain growth occurring postnatally is substantially greater in humans than it is in 
chimpanzees (i.e. the area beneath the postnatal section of human curve is substantially 
greater). 
 
Socialization, mirroring and Theory of Mind 
 
Explanations of the specific advantages of extensive relative post-natal brain growth 
focus on the adaptiveness of a „critical period‟ in which the brain can be „tuned‟ to its 
environment during a relatively plastic growth phase. Some degree of neural plasticity 
continues well into adulthood (e.g. Merzenich 1987; Greenfield 1997, 115-118). However, 
the brain is particularly plastic early in life as the synapses develop between neurons 
 7 
(„synaptogensis‟; Fig 3). Many of these developing synapses will be lost as the brain 
matures, due to competition for limited synaptic space and neural apoptosis 
(„programmed cell death‟; Fig 3). Thus the synaptic capacity of immature neurons is 
almost 50% greater than that of adult cells (Lenroot and Giedd 2006, 720). In the 
prefrontal cortex, peak synaptic density occurs at 3-4 years of age and declines as brains 
mature, particularly after puberty (Höistad et al. 2009, 6; Bear et al. 2007, 709), as 
those synapses that are reinforced by frequent use out-compete those that are under-
utilized, and grow stronger to enable more efficient transmission of information 
between neurons that are frequently associated in particular recurrent tasks (Deacon 
1997). „Slower‟ trajectories of brain growth thus allow for a much longer period of 
„experience-expectant information storage‟ (Greenough et al. 1987) over which these 
processes of synaptic proliferation, competition and pruning and neural apoptosis can 
occur (Figure 3), and during which they can be influenced by environmental stimuli 
(Bear et al. 2007; Westermann et al. 2006; see also Grove and Coward 2008 for further 
discussion). This long period of extreme plasticity in human children coincides with the 
development of „higher-order‟ neurobehavioural cognitive functions, including highly 
developed motor and social skills (Courchesne et al. 2003: 343). 
 
The mirror neuron system 
Mirror neurons, which are activated by both performance and observation of specific, 
goal-directed actions (Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004), were first identified in macaques 
and only later in humans. Until very recently, most work has thus assumed an 
evolutionarily primitive heritage among primates for the basic mechanisms involved in 
motor emulation that were elaborated later in the hominin and human lines. However, 
more recent work has suggested that the information necessary to match observed with 
executed actions may not be (completely) genetically specified, but that sensorimotor 
learning during development may also have a vital role to play. Experimental work has 
demonstrated that the functioning of the mirror neuron system (MNS) in both monkeys 
and humans is strongly affected by training and experience (Catmur et al. 2008; Iriki 
and Sakura 2008; Catmur et al. 2007; Keysers and Gazzola 2006; Ferrari et al. 2005), 
suggesting that the „mirroring‟ properties of the system are not completely innate. 
Instead, many are acquired through simple Hebbeian or associative learning processes,  
in which the temporal correlation of observation and motor performance activates both 
neural circuitries simultaneously, entraining the circuitries associated with both 
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observation of others‟ actions (in multiple sensory modes) and kinaesthetic and sensory 
feedback from one‟s own actions and links them into a shared „mirroring system‟, The 
Hebbeian maxim is thus, „what fires together wires together‟ (Catmur et al. 2007; 
Keysers and Perrett 2004). 
Neurological imaging and kinematic studies have demonstrated the vital role of 
sensorimotor functions and bodily „know-how‟ in tool manufacture and use (Stout et al. 
2008; Bril and Roux 2005; papers in Roux and Bril 2005) alongside - if not primary to - 
the „higher-level‟ prefrontal and executive functions presumably involved in the broader 
contexts of action from the sourcing of raw materials to schemata of use. Among all tool-
using primates, tool use is socially acquired and therefore likely to be reliant on MNS-
mediated motor imitation – suggesting that it is the evolution and/or development of 
the MNS that underpins the appearance and elaboration of stone tools in the 
archaeological record. While the monkey MNS has now been demonstrated to respond 
to actions performed with tools (previously thought to be a human specialism), this has 
been demonstrated only after a long period of experimentation and familiarization of 
the monkeys to the tools and their use (Ferrari et al. 2005, 213, 221). In contrast, recent 
studies have suggested that in humans mere observation, or even simply thinking about 
motor actions may be almost equivalent to actual motor practice in improving motor 
learning (Heyes 2001, 256). While trained individuals do demonstrate stronger 
activations in response to others‟ actions (for example, trained pianists report finding it 
difficult to keep their fingers still while listening to piano music), even naïve individuals 
show some degree of neural activation when they observe others‟ actions (Keysers and 
Gazzola 2006, 389). This probably reflects the flexibility inherent in the varying 
selectivity of different neurons in the MNS, with some responding only to very specific 
motor actions and others more broadly, so that even novel actions can be extrapolated 
from the wide variety of motor skills that are within the observer‟s motor vocabulary 
(Keysers and Gazzola 2006, 389).  
It is also notable that in monkeys, an MNS response to tool-actions was not 
sufficient for them to actually imitate the behaviour – given the opportunity to use a 
stick used in an experiment to access food left out of reach, the monkeys never 
attempted to do so (though at least one did pick up the stick and bite it; Ferrari et al. 
2005). In fact, primates generally, while good emulators (being able to reproduce the 
physical results of actions in often very creative ways), are usually considered rather 
poor at imitation. In Horner and Whiten‟s „puzzle box‟ experiments (2005), for 
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example, juvenile chimpanzees shown how to access food inside the box performed only 
those actions relevant to retrieve the prize, while human children performed even the 
unnecessary actions they had observed. However, results of similar experiments 
designed to test apes‟ imitation skills have been mixed, and Heyes‟ review of the 
evidence suggest that chimpanzees „can imitate to the extent that they have had prior 
experience of interacting with humans and/or explicit training to imitate‟ (Heyes 2001, 
253; see also Iacoboni 2005). Animals deliberately exposed to particular forms of 
stimuli not frequently encountered in the wild routinely develop skills and behaviours 
not practiced by their wild conspecifics – hence the mismatch in a wide range of 
cognitive skills demonstrated by human-enculturated and wild chimpanzees (e.g. 
Ferrari et al. 2005; Heyes 2001, 253), suggesting that development of both the MNS and 
imitation are heavily scaffolded by experience . 
A key observation here is that motor „mirroring‟ among humans is also very 
closely linked to social skills. Humans tend to (non-consciously) imitate one another‟s  
facial expressions, gestures and mannerisms during social interactions (Frith 2008), 
with the degree of mirroring related to high scores on paper tests for empathy. Such 
mirroring inclines the „imitated‟ party to perceive the interaction (and his/her 
interlocutor) positively (Heyes 2001, 256). Significantly, many of the motor actions 
involved in such social mirroring involve „perceptually opaque‟ movements. For 
„transparent‟ motor behaviours such as hand movements, others‟ and one‟s own actions 
can be perceived simultaneously and the neural pathways are thus amenable to simple 
associative learning processes. However, the movements of the face and trunk that are 
so crucial to social interaction are typically only visible using cultural artefacts such as 
mirrors, or through interaction with others (Catmur et al. 2007; Heyes 2001). Co-
activation and entrainment of the motor and sensory neural circuits involved in these 
actions requires that we, „watch others as they do what we are doing – whether they are 
deliberately imitating our movements, as adults imitate infants, or simply reacting in 
the same way to ongoing events, like fellow spectators at a sports match‟ (Catmur et al. 
2007, 1529; see also Keysers and Gazzola 2006, 396; Heyes 2001). 
The key to how the human MNS functions to imitate skilled behaviours such as 
tool manufacture and use is therefore to be found not only in phylogeny but also in 
ontogeny, as social skills and behaviours are critical to imitation and the acquisition of 
skilled motor actions. Chimpanzee tool use is of course highly skilled and socially 
acquired, particularly in the context of the mother-infant bond where infants have 
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strong intrinsic motivation to copy behaviour and mothers to facilitate such copying 
(e.g. Matsuzawa 2007). However, this facilitation stops short of formal teaching 
(Tomasello 1999), and it has been argued that chimpanzee learning is based on a dyadic 
subject-object framework (mother-infant; mother-object; infant-object; object-object) 
focused on the emulation of actions on objects, rather than on socially-referenced triadic 
relationships among mothers-and-infants-and-objects (Matsuzawa 2007, 10; see also 
Sherwood et al. 2008, 435).  In human children, such triadic relations commence from 
around 9 months of age (Sherwood et al. 2008, 435), and are strongly associated with 
other social skills, notably the capacities for joint attention and intentionality.  
Individuals of many species may act together, either because their actions 
mutually affect one another and become coordinated or because of „simultaneous 
affordances‟ in the environment that stimulate similar behaviours, for example a fresh 
carcass or indeed a buffet table (Knoblich and Sebanz 2008). However, higher levels of 
joint action may occur when individuals are able not only to perceive behavioural cues 
such as direction of gaze or bodily orientation but also to interpret them in the light of 
their own motor repertoire (via the MNS) and to attend to the same object(s) together  - 
for example a parent pointing out things of interest (Knoblich and Sebanz 2008). Gaze 
following in particular has been widely studied in a variety of animal species, but studies 
on chimpanzees have produced mixed results (Sherwood et al. 2008, 430, 434 for 
review) while both dogs (e.g. Hare and Tomasello 2005) and goats (Kaminski et al. 
2005) are consistently capable of following humans‟ gazes. This would suggest that 
domestication/socialization to (human) social systems in which joint attention is 
common may again be a key stimulus for the development of these abilities.  
Once individuals are able to determine what someone is attending to, they may 
also be able to compare their own perceptions with those of the other to determine 
whether they are shared (Knoblich and Sebanz 2008). This level of joint attention 
clearly requires complex social cognitive skills, notably Theory of Mind (see below), and 
is likely to be the essential prerequisite for teaching, allowing the instructor to 
determine whether the learner has all the necessary perceptual attention or whether 
attention-guiding gestures such as pointing may be necessary (Frith 2008). While, as 
noted above, chimpanzee mothers facilitate infants‟ learning by making all the 
necessary equipment available, they do not direct attention to parts of the task they get 
wrong or correct their mistakes (Matsuzawa 2007; Tomasello 1999), and chimpanzees 
do not appear to use „ostensive‟ gestures that would indicate the signal to follow will be a 
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deliberate communication about something of relevance to the receiver. In contrast, 
human infants are very sensitive to these behavioural cues; for example, eye contact 
prior to demonstration of a novel action or the naming of objects dramatically improves 
a child‟s imitation  of that action or recall of the name (Frith 2008).  
Among humans, individuals are also usually able to move beyond this stage of 
behavioural cueing to model the intentions behind actions and to engage in 
complementary action to aid (or to hinder) others‟ actions – joint intentionality. In 
order to achieve this it is necessary to represent both their own and others‟ 
contributions to the final goal (Knoblich and Sebanz 2008, 2025). Among humans, of 
course, there is a questionmark over the extent to which the evolution of human 
language scaffolds the development of higher stages of joint attention during childhood, 
or indeed the evolution of the underlying cognitive mechanisms among our hominin 
ancestors. However, many of these behaviours have precursors in other primates and 
thus were probably inherited from a common ancestor, and language learning itself is 
hugely reliant on social interaction and cognition in general, and ToM (see below), joint 
attention and perhaps also the MNS more specifically, suggesting that these forms of 
fundamentally social cognition are primary to language, not results of it. 
In short, far from being innate, genetically specified mechanisms for acquiring 
skilled behaviour, the MNS and skilled motor imitation more generally are hugely 
influenced by experience acquired during development, which is provided as much by 
the social as the physical environment. The acquisition of these skills, utilising 
genetically inherited basal capacities, is thus strongly associated with - and probably 
scaffolded by - fundamental mechanisms of social cognition such as Theory of Mind 
(ToM).  
 
Theory of Mind 
Theory of Mind (ToM) is perhaps most usefully defined as the ability to understand that 
not only do others think in much the same way that you do, but also that what they 
think may differ. This appreciation that others have a different perspective from 
yourself, and to model that alternative perspective, underpins human social interaction, 
and sets  us apart from most other primates in kind, and from all other primates in 
degree (see e.g. review in Emery and Clayton 2009). In modern human infants ToM 
emerges fully in infants by 4-5 years of age (Emery and Clayton 2009; Grove and 
Coward 2008 and references therein; Brüne and Brüne-Cohrs 2006, 440), i.e. during 
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the period of extreme plasticity occurring during the key phase of ontogenetic brain 
growth discussed previously.  
However, in some individuals ToM does not develop in the usual manner; autistic 
spectrum disorders (ASD), whose severe forms are sometimes known as Asperger‟s 
Syndrome, are characterized by deficits in social cognition and interaction and the 
avoidance of novel situations and behaviours of any kind. Although the specific nature 
of both the deficits and the neurological mechanism(s) involved in ASD remain the 
subject of considerable debate, one significant line of enquiry suggests that the 
condition can be defined, at least in part, by a lack of ToM abilities (Baron-Cohen et al. 
1985) while many other cognitive capacities and „non-social‟ forms of intelligence are 
preserved (Brüne and Brüne-Cohrs 2006, 446).  
In addition, individuals with ASD often demonstrate difficulties with imitation 
that seem to represent a failure of the ToM capacities that would normally „scaffold‟ the 
development of the MNS 
 
„…resulting from early inattention to social stimuli (including adults imitating the 
autistic infant), and deficits in joint attention reducing the frequency of 
synchronous movement in response to a common stimulus‟ (Heyes 2001, 259, 
 
such that Hebbeian processes responsible for the necessary neural connections 
do not occur, or occur to a lesser extent, in these individuals.  
A growing number of researchers have also implicated abnormal neurological 
developmental processes in ASD. Current evidence suggests that the autistic brain 
grows substantially faster than that of normally developing individuals (Courchesne et 
al. 2003, 2004, 2007; Redcay and Courchesne 2005), reaching adult weight 
considerably earlier as a result. Yet the adult brain size of autistic individuals does not 
differ significantly from that of neurotypical individuals, implying that it is the pattern 
of growth that is the crucial factor.  
In figure 4 we plot rates of brain growth of both neurotypical children and those 
with ASD  for comparison; the important point to note here is that the ASD phenotype 
involves a period of neural „overgrowth‟ relative to  neurotypical controls (Redcay and 
Courchesne 2005). As a result, children with ASD have substantially bigger brains than 
neurotypical controls between the ages of approximately 2 and 5, „at the beginning of an 
important period of developmental neuroplasticity and learning‟ (Courchesne et al. 
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2003:343). Courchesne and colleagues argue that this more rapid growth of the brain in 
individuals with ASD shortens the critical period during which experience of the 
physical and social environments may influence synaptic proliferation and pruning.  
One argument is that this reduction of the timeframe in which the selective 
effects of experience may „shape‟ patterns of neural development means that ASD 
synaptic proliferation is explosive and random, resulting in early fixation of potentially 
anomalous connections and the subsequent inability of the apoptosis mechanism to 
achieve targeted pruning of maladaptive synaptic connections (Casanova et al. 2008; 
see below). 
Further support for this position may be found in recent arguments that ASD 
individuals often experience sensory hypersensitivity. Individuals with ASD have much 
better eyesight (≈2.79x better than average) and more sensitive olfactory, haptic and 
auditory systems than neurotypical controls; furthermore, the degree of hypersensitivity 
correlates with scores on measures of ASD severity (Baron-Cohen et al. 2009). As 
Baron-Cohen et al. point out, such hypersensitivity could be the result of processing 
differences at multiple levels: sensory receptors could be denser or more sensitive, 
neural processing could be faster and/or top-down inhibition systems could be affected. 
This last might mean that the process of forming higher-level „holistic concepts and 
meaningful labels‟ (Snyder 2009) that usually help structure perception of sensory 
information and inhibit the costly processing of lower-level details does not occur (or 
occurs to a lesser extent) among individuals with ASD. These individuals would then 
routinely experience sensory „overload‟, with reduced top-down processing constraints 
resulting in a low signal-to-noise ratio.  
Neuroimaging of the brains of individuals with ASD does indeed appear to show 
reduced coordination of activity between association areas and those mediating 
perceptual and emotional processing. Brains are more connected between local regions, 
and differences in gyrification and in grey and white matter distribution (see below) 
suggest an increase in short-range relative to long-range connections (Casanova et al. 
2008). One argument is that among children with ASD, short-range neural connections 
proliferate at the expense of long-range  circuits and systems relating to top-down 
control and coordination during early development.Such a pattern of development 
might result from a failure of synaptic pruning mechanisms following early over-
production and/or a disturbance in white matter production, such as in processes of 
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myelination that would make long-range connections more efficient and competitive. 
(Casanova et al. 2008).  
 It therefore seems likely that the development and refinement of higher-order and 
particularly social cognition is intimately related to the evolution of slower trajectories 
of neural developmental trajectory in normally developing humans, relative to that in 
other primates and in our hominin ancestors, and that a focus on the interplay between 
ontogenetic and phylogenetic factors is therefore fundamental to understanding 
hominin brain evolution. Most studies of hominin brain evolution have focused 
primarily on gross brain size and/or the relative sizes of different brain and particularly 
neocortical structures. However, larger brains are associated not only with the energetic 
costs offset by changing life-history strategies, but also with significaitn processing 
costs, as increased brain (and body) size is associated with increased transmission times 
for nerve impulses. In addition, as the number of neurons increases, the number of 
connections between them increases exponentially, and thus, given already extremely 
high levels of connectivity between cortical neurons, larger brains are potentially highly 
costly and inefficient. The ways in which these costs are offset, and the ways in which 
these interrelate with solutions to large brains‟ energetic costs, have significant 
repercussions for large-brained species. Two of these adaptations to the increased 
processing costs of large brains – gyrification and the ratio of white to grey matter in the 
brain - are examined briefly  in the following sections.  
 
 
Gyrification 
 
Perhaps the most obvious feature of the brain‟s gross anatomy is the wrinkled and 
folded surface of the neocortex. Viewed in section, it is clear that some parts of the 
neocortex bulge outward (gyri) while some are folded inward (sulci). The ratio of total 
cortical surface (i.e. including the surface area of cortex hidden in cerebral sulci) to 
exposed cortical surface (i.e. excluding the surface area of cortex within sulci; Rilling 
2006) yields a „gyrification index‟ (GI) which varies both phylogenetically and 
ontogenetically (Figures 5 and 6). 
The traditional explanation for increased levels of gyrification in large-brained 
primates has centred on the need to fit a larger brain (or, more specifically, neocortex) 
into a semi-spherical skull. This explains why gyrification of the expanded surface of the 
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neocortex is more pronounced in larger-brained species (White et al. 2009; Rilling 
2006; Zilles et al. 1988) - figure 5 demonstrates the existence of distinct evolutionary 
relationships between GI and brain weight in prosimians and anthropoids: the latter 
have substantially higher GIs than the former across much of the range of empirically 
documented brain weights, and GI increases with brain weight at a substantially higher 
rate in anthropoid primates (though it should be noted that the abscissa in Figure 5 
represents a logarithmic scale, indicating that, although GI is absolutely higher in larger 
brained animals, GI as a ratio to brain weight is relatively higher in smaller-brained 
primates). 
Among humans the degree of gyrification in some areas (notably 
temporal/parietal association regions and prefrontal cortex) is even greater than 
predicted from our larger brain size (White et al. 2009; Sherwood et al. 2008; see also 
Rilling 2006). This observation is better explained by newer theories of gyrification 
which argue that sulci and gyri develop as strongly connected regions are drawn 
together by the many axons linking them, reducing transit time for action potentials and 
enhancing the efficiency of specific circuits (White et al. 2009; Lenroot and Giedd 2006, 
720). Such a mechanism would explain the general link between brain size and GI (as 
transit time and efficiency become increasingly significant costs as brains become 
absolutely larger), and the human deviation from general mammalian trends in this 
regard is of particular interest here, suggesting adaptations for processing efficiency 
over and above those required by encephalization per se. 
The argument that gyrification relates to the development and elaboration of 
neural circuits also explains the ontogenetic changes in gyrification. Early stages of 
gyrification occur in the foetus only 10-15 weeks after conception (White et al. 2009, see 
Figure 5), but it is during the third trimester (when maternal resources are increasing 
directed towards foetal brain growth; see above) that GI increases dramatically and the 
brain begins to develop its adult morphology (White et al. 2009, see below; Lenroot and 
Giedd 2006). Although it was traditionally thought that gyrification plateaus after birth 
(i.e. matches the threefold postnatal volumetric growth of the brain), 3D techniques of 
assessing GI are now beginning to document changes in GI occurring throughout 
childhood and adolescence (White et al. 2009). In particular, gyrification appears to 
increase significantly in later-maturing regions such as prefrontal cortex between 6 and 
16 years and declines thereafter, perhaps especially at adolescence (White et al. 2009). 
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Although individuals‟ patterns of gyrification do appear to be strongly heritable, 
there is considerable individual variation and monozygotic twins also show considerable 
differences. Deeper and earlier-developing sulci such as the Sylvian fissure (the two very 
deep sulci lateral sulci that are one of the most prominent landmarks of the brain) are 
more similar between twins (and thus likely to be more highly constrained genetically) 
than superficial sulci which develop postnatally and which may thus be more plastic in 
response to stimuli from the physical and social environments (Sherwood et al. 2006; 
White et al. 2009).  
In short, then, the phylogenetic and ontogentic development of gyrification 
indices in the human brain suggest adaptations for greater connectivity to offset the 
potential inefficiency of larger brains – and, indeed, the evolution of gyrification indices 
greater even than this requirement in some parts of the human brain. Ontogenetically, 
the gradual development of gyrification among late-maturing parts of the brain may 
suggest a role for developmental experience in literally shaping the adult brain. 
 
 
Grey and White Matter Ratios 
 
The relative balance of „grey‟ and „white‟ matter in the brain provides an alternative 
perspective on these processes. Grey matter (actually a blood-suffused rosy colour in the 
living brain) is comprised of neural cell bodies, while „white‟ matter is mainly comprised 
of supporting glial tissue such as astrocytes (which play a role in regulating neuronal 
energy uptake), oligodendrocytes and myelin (the former synthesizes the latter, which 
sheathes axons to facilitate long-range propagation of action potentials; Barton 2006).  
The ratio of neurons to glia has long been known to vary phylogenetically (see 
Figure 7), with larger-brained (and bodied) species having lower neuronal densities 
(Barton 2006; Sherwood et al. 2006). However, in larger-brained species those neurons 
are larger and have longer and thicker axons (improving conduction velocity) which are 
increasingly myelinated (sheathed in fatty myelin), helping to insulate them and 
speeding up synaptic transmission), thus conserving processing speed in the face of 
greater transmission distances (Barton 2006). As brains grow larger across speciesthe 
volume of white matter thus rises disproportionately (Sherwood et al. 2006), and the 
ratio of grey to white matter in human brains is as expected for a primate of our brain 
size (Smaers et al. 2010; Schoenemann et al. 2005), making them relatively more 
 17 
connected than those of smaller nonhuman primates - perhaps especially in prefrontal 
areas (Höistad et al. 2009, 5). 
However, ratios of white to grey matter also vary ontogenetically. Most of the 
neurons we will ever have are present by birth, and therefore volumes of grey matter do 
not change significantly post-natally. The rapid postnatal growth of the brain is instead 
due mainly to proliferation of synapses, maturation of the glial cells and myelination of 
axons (Höistad et al. 2009, 5), and white matter volume thus increases dramatically 
between birth and adolescence (see Figure 8), when considerable amounts of synaptic 
pruning occur. Myelination of cortical axons begins before birth. First to myelinate are 
the spinal cord and brainstem; the fibres linking the cerebellum to the cerebral cortex 
and which are necessary to the fine control of voluntary movement only begin to 
myelinate after birth, and do not mature until about 4 years of age (Höistad et al. 2009, 
5; Grove and Coward 2008; Lenroot and Giedd 2006), while intra-cortical connections, 
particularly in prefrontal regions, continue to myelinate well into the third decade of 
life, and do not decline here until after 50 years (see Figure 3 and refs in Höistad et al. 
2009, 401). In contrast, in humans grey matter growth declines after the age of 5, with 
volumes peaking at 10-12 years in frontal and parietal and 16-18 years in temporal 
regions (Höistad et al. 2009). 
Both gyrification and white:grey matter ratios undergo significant changes during 
adolescence, when a variety of gross psychological and behavioural changes also occur 
and also when a number of psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia first manifest. 
This may thus be another critical period for brain development, as growth patterns 
change and brains enter the later, less plastic stages of maturation. While ASD seems to 
relate to atypical early  brain development trajectories (see above),  schizophrenia has 
been argued to represent an exaggeration of „normal‟ brain maturation mechanisms 
occurring during adolescence, such as reductions in grey matter volume, although 
myelin deficiencies and changes in white matter volume also often occur (Paus 2001; 
Paus et al. 2008, cited Höistad et al. 2009, 1, 6). While arguments continue to rage over 
the relative contributions of genetic inheritance and environment to conditions such as 
schizophrenia and ASD, genetic components do appear to be substantial (Picchioni and 
Murray 2007; Freitag 2006), suggesting high heritability of such developmental 
disturbances, which may be an unwelcome negative result of the extreme scaling of large 
brains. As discussed above, large brains – or, rather, enlarged neocortices – necessarily 
entail several functional correlates in order to maintain efficiency. They are  increasingly 
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dominated by disproportionately large late-maturing neocortices, which are increasingly 
closely inter-connected, with greater ratios of white to grey matter and larger 
gyrification indices. All of these  features of large brains require concomitantly slower 
maturational schedules and thus longer „critical periods‟ of plasticity during which they 
are influenced by social and physical environmental stimuli. The downside would seem 
to be that the complexity and prolongation of the process of „wiring‟ the brain renders 
larger brains more vulnerable to a variety of developmental abnormalities such as ASD 
or schizophrenia, as well as to degenerative conditions such as Alzheimer‟s or multiple 
sclerosis (Sherwood et al. 2006), suggesting that humans‟ large brains may be near the 
functional limits of encephalization (see e.g. Hofman 2001 for discussion) 
 
 
Discussion: the Evolution of Ontogeny 
 
The complex relationship between the phylogenetical evolution of the human brain and 
its ontogenetic development merits serious consideration of the extent to which the two 
processes may have interacted throughout hominin evolution  (see e.g. Zollikofer & 
Ponce de Léon 2010 for discussion). Relatively small variations in developmental 
patterns can have large effects both overall brain size and the relative sizes of brain 
components. One hypothesis is that encephalization may have been achieved via 
relatively simple single-gene mutations affecting the number of cycles of symmetric 
division precursor cells for neurons undergo before each cell begins to increase 
exponentially (Rakic 2009, 726): the more precursor cells that can be formed, the larger 
the structure that results, and as brain size increases, late-maturing structures such as 
the neocortex grow disproportionately larger via the same mechanism (Finlay and 
Darlington 2005; Finlay et al. 2001). Many of the genes thought to have been under 
selection in recent human evolution are believed to be regulatory genes governing the 
timing of developmental processes, and indeed regulatory genes may be fundamental to 
evolution more generally (Vaquerizas et al. 2009, 260). 
Large brains are associated with many costs, including reduced efficiency and 
high energetic demands. Nevertheless, encephalization has clearly been adaptive among 
primates generally, and the hominin lineage in particular, indicating that these costs are 
adequately balanced on an evolutionary timescale by benefits. One obvious possibility is 
that large brains are adaptive because of a net cognitive gain of some kind, although the 
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nature of the relationships between brain size, cognitive prowess and behavioural 
sophistication remains frustratingly unclear. Another possibility is that the wider 
constellation of adaptations surrounding large brains themselves are also adaptive.  
As we have seen, comparison of human brains with those of other primates 
demonstrate clearly that the energetic and efficiency costs of larger brains have been 
met by evolutionary changes to the structure of the adult brain - for example through 
increasing gyrification and greater proportions of white to grey matter – as well as to 
broader life histories strategies such as  longer, slower developmental schedules (Isler & 
van Schaik 2009). However, it is also highly possible that these „side-effects‟ of larger 
brains were also adaptive in and of themselves, and contributed to a positive feedback 
loop during hominin evolution in which the ontogenetically selective effects of extended 
„critical periods‟ of development, via which the structure of the brain itself can be at least 
partly fine-tuned to be optimal for the required functions, was also evolutionarily 
adaptive and therefore selected for in and of itself, 
Larger brains are of necessity relatively more interconnected brains to maintain 
efficiency of signalling; however, the complexity of human (and indeed ape) behaviour 
and of the neural „wiring‟ involved is such that our brains require extremely significant 
environmental input from both the physical and social environments if the individual is 
to function sufficiently well to survive and to negotiate a complex social world in order 
to reproduce. Thus, an increasing reliance on physical and especially social interaction 
to structure hominins‟ slower-growing brains is likely to have been adaptive not only as 
a means of off-setting the energetic and processing costs of larger brains, but also 
because it allowed the development of elaborated forms of hgher-order and social 
cognition possible only in the context of extended periods of growth and slower 
trajectories of neural development. Modern human patterns of brain growth and 
development trajectories may thus represent an extreme state of such a positive 
feedback loop, maximising the length of time during which environmental input can 
significantly influence the brain and allow the development of complex forms of 
cognition, to the extent that only small deviations are associated with conditions such as 
ASD and schizophrenia, which significantly impact on particularly social cognition, and 
reduce the likelihood of reproduction and thus evolutionary fitness (Avila et al. 2001; 
Walsh et al. 2008). 
Clearly, such fine-grained neurological developmental processes as gyrification 
and white:grey matter ratios cannot be studied directly in fossil remains. Work is 
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needed to establish the extent to which they may be estimated from proxies such as 
gross brain sizes ascertained from endocranial volumes or from the, many elements of 
the broaderlife-histories of extinct hominins which can be accessed in the fossil record, 
and allow tentative estimates as to the nature and timing of possible inflection points in 
the evolution of human developmental scheduling.   
In a previous paper (Grove and Coward 2008) the authors argued for Homo 
erectus as a possible break-point in hominin developmental scheduling. More recent 
work, including a comprehensive review by Robson and Wood (2008) and work by 
Zollikofer and Ponce de Léon (2010) have since provided further data, and allow a more 
detailed consideration of the evidence.  
Certainly in terms of overall brain size Homo erectus would seem to be a highly 
plausible candidate. „Archaic‟ hominins (the pre-erectines, in Robson & Wood‟s 
terminology; 2008) remained relatively small-brained (with the larger brains of the 
robust australopithecines apparently a specialized adaptation related to their derived 
dental and jaw morphology; DeSilva and Lesnik 2008). DeSilva and Lesnik calculated 
that the brains of australopithecine neonates would have been around 38.1% of adult 
size at birth and those of early Homo 35.2%, compared to values of ~40% for 
chimpanzees and only 29% for humans (see refs in Franciscus 2009), suggesting a 
general lack of selection for secondary altriciality for both the australopithecines and the 
earlier Sahelanthropus and Ardipithecus (refs in Zollikofer and Léon 2010, 447; Robson 
and Wood 2008, 412-415). The rejection of derived life-history scheduling for these 
early hominins is also supported by dental data documenting a more rapid trajectory of 
growth (Robson and Wood 2008, 411), although dental analyses of the robust 
australopithecines underline the mosaic nature of life history among different hominins 
by suggesting a unique „package‟ of dental ontogenetic scheduling (Zollikofer and Ponce 
de Léon 2010, 447). 
Only among Homo erectus specimens (sensu lato) do brain sizes increase to 
nearer modern than chimpanzee values (DeSilva and Lesnik 2008; Leigh 2006; Walker 
and Ruff 1993), and a number of studies have suggested that Homo erectus brain sizes 
were consistent with modern human brain-growth, with only ~33.1% of adult brain size 
achieved by birth (DeSilva and Lesnik 2008; Robson and Wood 2008). Other 
anthropological and archaeological developments associated with late erectus have also 
been used to suggest a significant change in lifeways including increased body size 
(Robson and Wood 2008), a greater focus on dietary meat and longer limbs suggesting 
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adaptations for more efficient bipedalism (O‟Connell et al. 1999) as well as expansion 
into northern latitudes (see refs in Grove and Coward 2008, 396) that might relate to 
both dietary and social innovations in meeting the different energetic demands of 
human developmental schedules. The association of erectus with the handaxe in 
particular has been argued to suggest an increased role for cognitive mechanisms 
permitting the faithful imitation of skilled motor behaviours. Acquiring the skills of 
Oldowan core-and-flake technologies may require only a relatively straightforward 
extension of action repertoires and social skills (Knoblich and Sebanz 2008). However, 
more complex tool behaviours involving „roughing-out‟ stages intended not to produce 
useful flakes but to prepare for later stages of manufacture may require higher levels of 
joint attention and intentionality to learn - the imitation, rather than emulation, of goal-
directed rather than simply sequential motor sequences. Thus ToM is also likely to be 
significant here (Knoblich and Sebanz 2008) in order to translate between one‟s own 
and others‟ perceptions – from „what I see‟ to „what s/he sees‟ and vice versa) – even 
before considering the significance or otherwise of handaxe symmetry, symbolism 
and/or „sexiness‟ (Hodgson 2009a, 2009b; Kohn and Mithen 1999 and comments 
thereafter; Wynn 1995; see also McNabb this volume for further discussion).  
However, other research has suggested that Homo erectus may not have been 
quite so modern after all. In particular, interpretations based on two of the major fossil 
specimens for examining life history scheduling in Homo erectus - the Mojokerto and 
Nariokotome juveniles – remain controversial. A mismatch in age at death as calculated 
using dental and skeletal methods for the Nariokotome juvenile (Dean and Smith 2009; 
Walker and Leakey 1993) has been used to argue that the derived modern human 
pattern of delayed juvenile growth and catch-up adolescent growth-spurt had not yet 
become established (Smith and Tompkins 1995), and that the Nariokotome boy had 
already undergone an early growth spurt more similar to that known among 
chimpanzees (Zollikofer & Ponce de Léon 2010, 448). Several more recent analyses of 
the material have also argued for a primate-style growth trajectory (Dean and Smith 
2009; DeSilva and Lesnik 2006; Leigh 2006).  
Age estimates of the Mojokerto child vary much more widely, ranging from 0.1-
1.5yrs to 4-6 years of age at death, and make it difficult to determine how much brain 
growth had occurred during gestation. If the Mojokerto child does fall at the younger 
end of this proposed age-range this would suggest a fast trajectory of growth more akin 
to that of modern non-human primates. However, if older a slower, more derived 
 22 
„human‟ pattern is more likely (DeSilva and Lesnik 2006; Coqueugniot et al. 2004). 
Meanwhile, while the the subadult specimen from Dmanisi apparently developed faster 
than modern humans based on its degree of skeletal maturation, it nevertheless fell 
within the 95% range of modern human variation (Zollikofer & Ponce de Léon 2010, 
446). Zollikofer and Ponce de Léon‟s recent review concluded that early brain growth in 
Homo erectus was likely to have been fast (i.e., more „modern‟), but that these rates 
were not sustained for long (i.e., more „primitive‟; 2010, 446).   
In short, the Homo erectus material does not provide unambiguous evidence of a 
shift towards derived human life history and developmental scheduling. Perhaps this is 
not surprising given the wide geographical and temporal distribution and variability of 
specimens.  
It is therefore worth expanding on the arguments put forward previously (Grove 
and Coward 2008) to consider the later pre-modern Homo species more thoroughly. 
Although antecessor, heidelbergensis and neanderthalensis share considerable 
similarities with modern Homo sapiens in both postcranial and cranial morphology, 
insofar as it is fair to judge from the archaeological record they appear to have 
demonstrated several differences in behaviour and perhaps also cognition. Body masses 
and brain sizes among these species are statistically indistinguishable from those of 
modern Homo sapiens, and DeSilva and Lesnik (2008) calculate that ~29.5% of brain 
growth would have been completed prenatally among Middle Pleistocene Homo, 
compared to a figure of 29.9% for modern humans. Zollikofer and Ponce de Léon (2010) 
suggest that while postnatal brain growth rates were higher among Neanderthals than 
modern humans, their larger adult brain sizes meant they took the same amount of time 
to develop as in modern humans. 
However, a variety of other lines of evidence have also been used to investigate 
patterns of gestation and development in these mid- Pleistocene species. Studies on 
dental development, including crown and root formation and eruption times, have given 
mixed results (perhaps not surprising given the small sample sizes of many of the 
studies and the variability of modern human dental developmental schedules). Studies 
have variously argued that Neanderthals:  
1. Developed on faster and more rapid trajectories than Homo sapiens (e.g. Smith 
et al. 2007); 
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2. Had shifted towards the derived slow growth rate characteristic of humans 
relative to the shorter, more rapid periods of growth of Homo antecessor and Homo 
heidelbergensis (e.g. Bermúdez de Castro et al. 1999);  
3. Developed on a trajectory almost indistinguishable from modern humans 
(Machiarelli et al. 2006; Guatelli-Steinberg et al. 2005; Ramírez Rossi and Bermudez de 
Castro 2004; Dean et al. 2001), and 
4. Shared with all pre-modern Homo, including erectus (s.l.) a similar pattern of 
dental development, in contrast to non-human primates and archaic hominins, with 
Homo ergaster representing the evolutionary link between the two (e.g. Bermúdez de 
Castro et al. 2003; see review in Robson and Wood 2008, 414).  
The much better preserved fossil record of the Neanderthals (including many 
finds of juveniles and two neonates (Holloway et al. 2004) also allows consideration of 
other skeletal traits that might inform on life history strategies, notably the dimensions 
and shape of the pelvis. Trinkaus (1984) had suggested that Neanderthal pubic 
morphology was consistent with a longer period of gestation in this species, but this 
suggestion was strongly refuted by Rak and Arensburg (1987) and Rosenburg (1988). 
More recently, Weaver and Hublin (2009), based on the pelves of the Tabun female and 
Kebara male, concluded that Neanderthals retained a more primitive birth mechanism 
than modern humans, but that obstetric difficulty would have been about the same in 
both species.  
In addition, the stage of skeletal growth attained by the adolescent Neanderthal 
skeleton Le Moustier 1 by 10.5-13yrs of age would locate it in the lower part of the 
modern human bodily growth trajectory - although its height was only slightly less than 
that of modern humans, suggesting that Neanderthal adolescents probably underwent a 
similar growth spurt to modern humans (see e.g. Zollikofer & Ponce de Léon 2010, 448 
for refs). 
This admittedly brief survey of work on life history evolution in later Homo 
indicates a number of variable adaptations with no simple dichotomy between 
„fast‟/primate and „slow‟/human strategies (DeSilva and Lesnik 2008; Robson and 
Wood 2008, 417; Crews and Gerber 2003, 13), but nevertheless a gradual development 
of the characteristic modern human condition of expanded juvenile period of 
development,  , with Homo erectus (s.l.) perhaps pushing the boundaries of non-human 
primates strategies, and Homo heidelbergensis and neanderthalensis approaching, if 
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not quite matching, modern human developmental schedules (cf. Hodgson this 
volume).  
 The significance of this slower developmental scheduling lies in its association with 
extended periods of brain growth, and hence the greater degree of environmental 
influence the growing brain was subject to during the critical periods of synaptogenesis 
and synaptic competition.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Investigation into the evolution of modern human cognition has focused primarily on 
insights from phylogenetic comparison of gross brain size and structure of human brain 
and those of other primates. The role of ontogenetic and developmental factors has not 
been accorded the significance it deserves in studying the evolution of cognition, and 
particularly of technological and social behaviours.  
The implications for archaeology are significant. Two of the most significant 
elements of modern human cognition, the Mirror Neuron System and Theory of Mind, 
are both strongly reliant on social and kinaesthetic experience scaffolded by social 
interaction for full realization in human infants, and their elaboration in modern 
humans may be related to our much longer periods of development and particularly 
dependent childhood relative to other primates. During this time brains continue to 
develop and mature in the context of social and physical environments which impact on 
the processes of synaptic competition and pruning and myelination, as documented by 
changing patterns of gyrification and ratios of grey to white matter. These „slower‟ 
trajectories of growth (relative to those of other primates) are of course part and parcel 
of wider life-history strategies related to the re-structuring of energetic budgets across 
the whole lifespan necessitated by encephalization. At the same time, adaptations to the 
processing costs of larger brains - in particular, the phylogenetic patterns of gyrification 
and the ratio of white to grey matter – led to increasing interconnectivity of hominin 
and human neocortices, and these processes also had significant effects on cognition. It 
is the scale and complexity of those connections, and the structuring role of 
environmental input in their development - that both allows the elaborations of the 
MNS and ToM seen among modern humans, and their interaction, and that renders 
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humans more vulnerable to developmental and/or degenerative disruption of normal 
processing. 
It is possible that this role of ontogenetic experience in shaping the brain was a 
fortuitous by-product of encephalization adaptive for other reasons. However, the 
potential adaptiveness of the neural and cognitive plasticity that results may also have 
been adaptive in and of itself, and an alternative possibility may be that large brains are 
a by-product of selection for increasing neural plasticity achieved through delayed 
maturation of the brain. The modern human brain and cognition is likely to be the result 
of a complex constellation of selective pressures and releases linking encephalization, 
long,slower life histories and delayed maturation of the brain, larger and more complex 
social groups and subsistence practices etc. (see e.g. Coward & Grove submitted figure 
1), and there is no reason why selective pressures should have remained constant or 
equal throughout hominin evolution, but it does seem clear that ontogenetic processeses 
of neural development, and the structuring experience of and interaction with the social 
and physical world are likely to have been extremely significant throughout hominin 
evolution.   
Early developments in the hominin line, notably the habitual use of stone tools in 
the extraction of animal protein (only appearing themselves at 2.6mya (Semaw et al. 
1997) but attested to by cutmarks on bones from 3.3mya (McPherron et al. 2010)), 
would seem to represent significant behavioural changes from panin lifeways. Not only 
are these stone tools used in rather different ways, but they also seem to demonstrate 
enhanced levels of motor skill relative to those known among even enculturated and 
trained chimpanzees (Delagnes & Roche 2005) – possibly related to the adoption of 
bipedalism and the release of locomotive selective pressures on wrist and hand anatomy 
(Ambrose 2001, 1750; Hodgson this volume). However, these early tools do not seem to 
be accompanied by any obvious fossil indicators of changed life histories (Robson & 
Wood 2008), and appear to be explicable in terms of more skilled forms of motor 
emulation, rather than goal-level (socially-scaffolded) imitation, and it is not until the 
appearance of Mode 2 and subsequent technologies that it is clear that at least 
precursors of the cognitive skills involved in fine-grained imitation and social 
interaction had become established at a level distinguishing hominins from other 
primates. However, these early changes in lifeway may represent the earliest 
elaborations on a basic primate theme, establishing the selective environments which 
made the later elements of the modern human cognitive suite adaptive. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. The trajectories of human and chimpanzee brain growth compared. The three 
human trajectories are from autopsy samples; the lines shown are the best-fit lines 
calculated by Kretschmann et al. (1979) from the raw data in each case. The chimpanzee 
line was calculated by fitting the growth equation of Kretschmann and colleagues, 
            
  
                
, to data published by Herndon et al. (1999). 
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Figure 2. The similarity between the growth curves of chimpanzees and humans; the 
„shifted chimpanzee‟ is born as altricial as a human, and follows a very similar trajectory. 
The curves show human data from the Hannover Medical School sample (Kretschmann 
et al. 1979) and chimpanzee data from the Herndon et al. (1999) database. Both curves 
show male growth trajectories. 
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Figure 3. Sequence of events in brain maturation (redrawn from Lenroot and Giedd 
2006 figure 1). Neurulation, the initial development of neurons, occurs first and is 
followed by multiple cycles of the production of new neurons (neurogenesis). New 
connections begin to be established between neurons (synaptogenesis), and the axons of 
different neurons „compete‟ for space to synapse on the dendrites of recipient neurons 
and thereby establish a connection between those neurons (synaptic competition). 
Programmed cell death (apoptosis) prunes under-utilized neurons throughout these 
processes. Axons connecting neurons are ensheathed in fatty myelin to insulate and 
speed up action potentials travelling between those neurons, while further development 
and multiple branching (arborisation) of dendrites and axons and denrities continues 
throughout life.  
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Figure 4. Chimpanzee, non-autistic, and autistic human growth rates over the first five 
years of life. Note all lines are scaled to proportion of adult brain weight; there is of 
course a vast difference between the sizes of chimpanzee and human brains, with ASD 
and non-ASD brains being virtually identical in size by adulthood. The human curve is 
calculated from Hannover Medical School data (Kretschmann et al. 1979), and the 
chimpanzee curve from the Herndon et al. (1999) database. The autistic overgrowth 
curve is calculated by multiplying the Hannover Medical School curve by age-specific 
values of the Redcay and Courchesne (2005) autistic overgrowth equation. 
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Figure 5. The phylogeny of the gyrification index in prosimians and anthropoids (data 
from Zilles et al. 1989). 
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Figure 6. The ontogeny of the gyrification index in humans (data from Zilles et al. 
1988; curve fit as per the Kretschmann et al. 1979 procedure - see caption to Figure 1). 
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Figure 7. The phylogeny of grey and white matter ratios (data from Frahm et al. 1982).  
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Figure 8. The white matter growth trajectory compared to the average growth 
trajectory for all brain elements in humans (equations from Klekamp et al. 1989). 
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